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Abstract 
Over the past 25 years, safe Conservative seats in the affluent Merseyside suburbs have instead 
become safe Labour seats. This remarkable political transition poses an important puzzle for 
students of voting behaviour. Analysis of voting patterns since 1979 underlines the exceptional scale 
of the shift to Labour on Merseyside compared to other metropolitan areas. Yet, substantial swings 
to Labour in suburban constituencies like Sefton Central and Wirral South in 2015 and 2017 cannot 
be explained with reference to wider evidence of the party’s increased support among younger, 
more diverse, cosmopolitan populations. It is shown that Labour dominance on Merseyside has 
occurred via three distinct phases, with the political map of the city-region turning red, over time, 
from the core outwards. Explanations rooted in the changing relationship between the city and its 
suburbs are argued to best explain the emergence of Merseyside as a ‘red conurbation’.  
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The Merseyrail network forms the UK’s most extensive suburban rail network outside of London. 
Comprising two principal lines, the network connects central Liverpool to its suburban hinterland 
and, beyond, to a number of free-standing towns. The Northern Line extends, northwards, from 
Hunts Cross, an affluent suburban neighbourhood on the south-eastern fringe of Liverpool, through 
the city centre and then splits into three branches. The first branch runs to the seaside resort of 
Southport, via the former dock communities of Bootle and the affluent suburban communities of 
Crosby and Formby. The second extends to the historic Lancashire market-town of Ormskirk, via 
Aintree and Maghull, and the third, via Fazakerley, to the post-war new town of Kirkby. The Wirral 
Line’s four branches connect a loop of four city centre underground stations, via the Mersey’s 
former shipbuilding town of Birkenhead, to affluent suburban communities in Hoylake, Wallasey and 
Port Sunlight, with trains terminating in New Brighton, West Kirkby, Chester and Ellesmere Port. A 
more expansive definition of the network, that covered by Merseyrail’s ‘all-zone’ pass, includes the 
City Line, which connects Liverpool Lime Street eastwards to the metropolitan boroughs of Knowsley 
and St Helens. Defined this way, ‘Merseyrailside’ comprises 92 stations, extending 36 miles from 
Southport in the north to Chester in the south and 27 miles from West Kirby in the west to Widnes in 
the east. Eighteen of the 19 parliamentary constituencies that can be reached on this extensive 
network were won by Labour at the 2017 General Election. All eight of the local authority districts it 
connects are currently Labour controlled.  
To some extent, Labour dominance in Greater Merseyside reflects more general, long-term patterns 
of the concentrations of Labour Party support in English metropolitan areas. However, as this article 
sets out, the growth of the Labour vote on Merseyside since the late 1970s easily surpasses that 
found in any other conurbation. Indeed, the extent of contemporary Labour dominance on 
Merseyside is both historically and geographically exceptional. In the eight constituencies making up 
the core of the conurbation, Labour vote shares in 2017 averaged 81 per cent. The four 
constituencies with the highest Labour vote shares in the country (Liverpool Walton; Knowsley; 
Liverpool Riverside; Bootle) were all located within this central zone of the Liverpool City-Region and 
recorded Labour vote shares of 84-86 per cent. Yet, the more remarkable development at recent 
elections has been the growth of the Labour vote in outer Merseyside. In the seven constituencies 
beyond the metropolitan core, Labour averaged 58.6 per cent of the vote in 2017, significantly more 
than its 41 per cent share in Great Britain as a whole. Proximity to Liverpool aside, there is no 
obvious explanation for the strength of Labour support in these affluent suburban areas. Whether 
viewed through the lens of 2011 Census data or through the window of a Merseyrail train, 
constituencies like Sefton Central and Wirral South simply do not look at all like safe Labour seats. As 
of June 2017, both are just that.   
This paper seeks to identify what prompted the Merseyside suburbs to turn, and stay, red when 
their equivalents elsewhere did not. While it dismisses explanations rooted in notions of Merseyside 
as a ‘red conurbation’, the article does argue that the exceptional shift to Labour in the city-region 
can only be explained with reference to locally-specific factors. These drivers, which have been as 
much economic and cultural as they have political, also owe a great deal to the role of regeneration 
policies in bringing about a remarkable reintegration of Liverpool and its suburbs in recent decades. 
 
Red Merseyside and other myths 
Sefton Central has a strong claim to be the most unlikely safe Labour seat in Great Britain. Located to 
the north of Liverpool and primarily comprising the towns of Crosby, Formby and Maghull, it is 
affluent, settled and suburban in character. Among Great Britain’s 633 parliamentary constituencies, 
it ranks second for home ownership (85.5%), 19th for the proportion of the population aged 65 and 
above (24.1%) and 65th for the proportion of the working-age population employed in higher grade 
occupations. In almost any other part of the country, this sort of socio-demographic profile would be 
indicative of a safe Conservative seat. Indeed, of the 25 constituencies in England with the most 
similar socio-demographic profiles to Sefton Central, 23 were won by the Conservatives in 2017. Yet, 
Sefton Central has been held by Labour since its creation in 2010 and with a steadily rising vote 
share. At the 2017 General Election, the Labour incumbent, Bill Esterson, increased his share of the 
vote to 63 per cent, a majority of 30 points over the second-placed Conservative candidate. Tellingly, 
Labour’s only other two victories in constituencies with similarly high proportions of home-owners, 
pensioners and managerial-professional workers were in Wirral South and Wirral West, both located 
just to the south of Liverpool, on the other side of the Mersey. In these seats too, Labour’s share of 
the vote rose in 2017, enabling Alison McGovern to secure an 18 point majority in Wirral South and 
Margaret Greenwood a 12 point majority in Wirral West. In both cases, these majorities exceeded 
those achieved by Labour candidates in these seats at the time of Tony Blair’s 1997 landslide. 
Table 1 summarises the unusual nature of Sefton Central, Wirral South and Wirral West among 
Labour-held seats. Among the 262 constituencies won by Labour in 2017, they rank first, second and 
third, respectively, for levels of home-ownership, with levels of owner occupation significantly above 
the average for Labour seats. Similarly, compared to other Labour seats, these suburban areas have 
unusual age profiles, ranking first, second and fourth among constituencies represented by the 
party’s MPs for the proportion of residents aged 65 plus. Levels of car ownership are higher than is 
typical for Labour seats, as is the proportion of working-age residents employed in higher-grade 
occupations. Meanwhile, White British residents make up 95-96 per cent of the population in all 
three constituencies, compared to an average of 74 per cent for all constituencies won by Labour in 
2017. In short, Labour’s new suburban heartlands in Merseyside are not typified by the 
concentrations of younger, diverse, cosmopolitan populations which are widely held to explain the 
party’s dramatic surge in support elsewhere in the country.   
 
Table 1: Key Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Merseyside’s affluent suburban constituencies 
(2011 Census data) 
 % Owner 
occupied 
housing 
Rank 
among 
Lab-
held 
seats 
% 
population 
aged 65+ 
Rank 
among 
Lab-
held 
seats 
% 
employ 
in high 
grade 
roles* 
Rank 
among 
Lab-
held 
seats** 
% 
Households 
with cars 
Rank 
among 
Labour 
held 
seats 
% 
population 
who are 
White 
British 
Rank 
among 
Labour 
held 
seats 
Sefton 
Central 
85.5 1 24.1 1 54.1 12 83.2 4 96.4 33 
Wirral 
South 
79.9 2 22.2 4 51.4 22 81.3 12 96.0 41 
Wirral 
West 
78.6 3 23.0 2 53.0 16 80.4 16 95.4 53 
Mean in 
Lab 
seats 
(n=262) 
60.7 --- 15.7 --- 39.5 --- 74.8 n/a 74.4 --- 
 
Census data aside, Labour’s dominance on Merseyside might seem unsurprising. A popular narrative 
has emerged in recent decades that casts Liverpool and its metropolitan hinterland as a uniquely 
left-wing city, with a long reputation for socialist radicalism. Depictions of a proud history of Scouse 
Socialism are commonplace. Marren refers to a “local tradition of trade union militancy, political 
radicalism and (…) an innate localised ‘culture of opposition’ characteristic to Liverpool”.1 An ‘insider’ 
account of the rise of the Militant Tendency in Liverpool declares that “The banner of the labour 
movement which was held by Glasgow – 'Red Clydeside' – in the aftermath of the First World War 
and during the 1920s has now passed, for the time being, to Liverpool”.2 At the 2016 Labour 
conference, party leader, Jeremy Corbyn, declared that “Liverpool has always been central to the 
Labour Party and to our movement”. Yet, this narrative of ‘Red Merseyside’ is essentially a myth. 
While there is more than enough in Liverpool’s political history to cherry-pick moments of notable 
left radicalism, Labour’s dominance in the city is a relatively recent phenomenon. The shift towards 
Labour in its suburbs is more recent still.  
Labourism came late to Liverpool. Among the 22 largest urban areas in Britain, only Liverpool and 
Portsmouth returned more Conservative than Labour MPs at the four general elections held in the 
1950s. In 1955, six of Liverpool’s nine parliamentary constituencies were won by Conservative 
candidates and it was not until 1964 that Labour reduced Conservative representation in the city to 
two MPs. Liverpool Garston, a mostly suburban constituency in the south-end of the city, was held 
continually by the Conservatives from 1950 to 1983, albeit with a brief Labour interlude from 1974-
79. A similar pattern was evident in local politics. It took until 1956 for Labour to secure a majority 
on Liverpool City Council, making it the last major British city to be governed by the party. Labour 
then controlled the city for only 23 of the following 50 years, with the Conservatives continuing to 
poll well enough to govern Liverpool from 1967-71. The eight years of Labour control from 1983-91, 
during which the Militant Tendency briefly held sway within the ruling Labour group, are, without 
doubt, responsible for much of the city’s reputation as a bastion of the left. It is rather less 
commonly noted that the Liberal Democrats were in majority control of Liverpool City Council from 
1998-2007, at a time when the Labour Party were ascendant in British politics nationally.  
If Liverpool’s post-war politics was more complicated than commonly supposed, matters always 
seemed more straightforward beyond the core city. The planned decentralisation of industrial jobs 
and housing created a solid Labour heartland to Liverpool’s immediate east, in what became the 
Metropolitan Borough of Knowsley following the 1974 reorganisation of local government. Beyond 
Knowsley, the mining town of St Helens, formally part of Merseyside since 1974, also remained 
solidly Labour. By contrast, two distinct sets of affluent suburban communities, one spread across 
the Wirral, to the south of Liverpool, the other along the Sefton coast, to its north, were safe 
Conservative territory. Aside from Birkenhead, parliamentary constituencies on the Wirral 
consistently returned Conservative MPs from 1950-87. While the Conservatives lost the ultra-
marginal seat of Wallasey to Labour in 1992, the party comfortably held Wirral West and Wirral 
South with majorities of 22 and 15 percentage points respectively. Crosby (from which Sefton 
Central was largely created in 2010) had been just as solidly Conservative. While Shirley Williams 
caused an upset by winning Crosby for the SDP in the famous November 1981 by-election, Malcolm 
Thornton promptly reclaimed the seat for the Conservatives at the 1983 general election, doubling 
his majority in 1987 and again in 1992. Like his counterpart in Wirral West, Thornton headed into the 
1997 general election with the cushion of a 22 point majority. These notable concentrations of 
Conservative support were also such that two of Merseyside’s five metropolitan boroughs, Sefton 
and Wirral, were controlled by the Conservatives from 1975-85, as was Merseyside County Council 
from 1977-81. Thereafter, the Conservatives remained a significant force in local government in 
Sefton and the Wirral. It is only since 2012 that Labour has controlled all 5 Merseyside local 
authorities simultaneously. 
 
The making of a metropolitan exception 
If Labour’s recent performance in outer-Merseyside is not a product of a long local tradition of left-
wing politics, is it perhaps a reflection of wider metropolitan trends? Merseyside is, after all, far from 
alone in witnessing a decline in Conservative Party fortunes and a related rise in support for Labour. 
The growth of Labour support in big cities and its decline in small towns and rural areas was evident 
by the early 1980s.3 Following the 2015 and 2017 elections, this trend has become even more 
pronounced, reflecting what Jennings and Stoker see as a growing bifurcation between growing 
‘cosmopolitan’ and declining ‘backwater’ constituencies.4 However, at a metropolitan scale, these 
patterns are less consistent than they are for core cities. Table 2 shows the vote shares obtained by 
the Conservatives and Labour in Greater London and the six metropolitan counties in 1979 and 
2017, and the net swing for each metropolitan area over this 38 year period. (The vote shares for 
1979 are based on estimates of the 1979 results using the 1983 boundaries, since it was only from 
1983 that parliamentary constituencies were aligned with the 1974 reorganisation of local 
government that created the metropolitan counties). 
As table 2 highlights, from 1979-2017, overall support for Labour increased in all metropolitan areas, 
with the exception of South Yorkshire. Metropolitan areas have therefore seen swings from 
Conservative to Labour generally well above those for Britain as a whole. However, there are also 
very significant differences between conurbations. In West Yorkshire, Tyne and Wear and the West 
Midlands, the 1979-2017 swing to Labour ranged from 4.0 to 6.6 points. The move towards Labour is 
notably stronger in Greater Manchester and Greater London, with long-term net swings in Labour’s 
favour of 9.2 and 13.9 points respectively. However, on Merseyside, there has been a remarkable 
22.8 point swing to Labour over this period. In 1979, the Conservatives had performed relatively well 
in Merseyside, with a county vote share just 4.2 points behind Labour. After Greater London and the 
West Midlands, Merseyside represented the third highest Conservative vote share in an English 
metropolitan area. By 2017, however, the Conservatives trailed Labour by a remarkable 49.8 points 
in Merseyside, which now ranked very clearly as Labour’s best, and the Conservative’s worst, 
performance across all 53 counties in England and Wales. The rise of Labour on Merseyside is clearly 
exceptional.  
 
Table 2: Labour and Conservative vote shares in Greater London and the metropolitan counties, 
2017 and 1979. 
 2017 1979 (1983 
boundaries) 
1979-
20012017 
 Con (%) Lab (%) Con (%) Lab (%) Net Swing  
Merseyside 21.4 71.2 40.8 45 -22.8 
Tyne and Wear 28.5 60.8 33.9 54.7 -5.7 
South Yorkshire 29.8 56.9 30.9 57.1 -0.5 
Greater Manchester 32.5 56.9 40.1 46 -9.2 
Greater London 33.1 54.5 46 39.6 -13.9 
West Yorkshire 37.8 53.3 38.4 46 -4.0 
West Midlands 39.9 52.4 45.5 44.8 -6.6 
GB 43.4 41.0 44.9 37.8 -2.4 
 
A simple comparison of two data points, 1979 and 2017, risks hiding significant fluctuations at the 
intervening general elections. Figure 1 therefore charts party shares of the vote on Merseyside at 
the 10 general elections from 1979-2017. As the graph illustrates, the rise in Labour’s vote share 
across Merseyside occurred in two key phases, the first from 1983 to 1997 and the second from 
2010 to 2017. In both phases, the Alliance/Liberal Democrats played a crucial role in shifting the 
balance between Labour and the Conservatives, ultimately to the benefit of Labour. At the 1983 
General Election, the Alliance had taken support from both Labour and the Conservatives. However, 
in 1987, the Alliance’s vote share plateaued, while the Conservatives’ share of the vote continued to 
decline, to the direct benefit of Labour. In 1992 and 1997, support for Labour increased further in 
Merseyside, in line with the party’s growth in support nationally. In 1997, 62 per cent of votes cast in 
Merseyside were for Labour, an increase of 22 points since 1983. At the 2001, 2005 and 2010 
General Elections, Labour’s share of the vote then dropped, but never below the level achieved in 
1992. Critically, this fall in Labour support left the Conservative vote share virtually unchanged at 
around 20 per cent, and it was the Liberal Democrats who proved to be the primary beneficiaries. 
Consequently, when the Liberal Democrat vote collapsed in 2015, it was Labour who gained, 
returning their support to the level recorded in 1997. The Conservatives recorded their lowest ever 
Merseyside vote share, despite winning a narrow majority in the Commons. In 2017, Labour 
increased its Merseyside share to 71 per cent, as the Liberal Democrat vote was squeezed further, 
and support for UKIP and the Greens collapsed.  
 
Figure 1: Party Shares of the Vote, Merseyside, 1979-2017   
The trends shown in Figure 1 inevitably reflect a mix of local and national shifts in support for the 
political parties. To strip out national influences, Figure 2 shows each party’s general election vote 
share on Merseyside from 1979 to 2017 as a ratio of its national vote share. This graph shows that, 
in 1979, Labour was already performing better on Merseyside than it was nationally. However, it is 
equally notable that both Conservative and Liberal vote shares in the conurbation at that time were 
close to their levels of support nationally. This picture was to change dramatically over the next nine 
general elections. The rise in Labour support locally in 1983 and 1987 was very much against the 
national trend, as was the related drop in Conservative support during this period. Thereafter, 
Labour continued to poll in Merseyside at about 1.4 times its national rate until 2010, when support 
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for Labour held up locally despite a sharp drop in the Labour vote nationally. In 2015, Labour’s 62 
per cent of the vote on Merseyside was double its national share. The other side of the story is 
arguably even more striking, however. From 1997 to 2017, the Conservatives increased their share 
of the vote in Great Britain from 32 to 43 per cent. Yet this rise in the Conservative vote nationally 
barely registered on Merseyside at all. In both 2015 and 2017, Conservative support was at half the 
level in the country as a whole.  
 
 
Figure 2: Party shares of the vote in Merseyside as ratio of each party's GB vote shares, 1979-2017  
 
Turning red from the inside out 
The phases identified above were accompanied by distinct geographical shifts in the balance of 
Labour and Conservatives support on Merseyside. In 1983 and 1987, Labour’s improved 
performance was concentrated in constituencies at the core of the conurbation. Table 3 ranks the 
swing over 2 elections from 1979-87 in each Merseyside constituency. In contrast to a 2.4 point 
swing nationally to the Conservatives over this period, every Merseyside seat saw a swing to Labour. 
However, the variations in swing were enormous, revealing clear differences between an 
economically decaying metropolitan core and the still affluent metropolitan suburbs. The biggest 
swings to Labour were all in Liverpool or Knowsley, districts hit exceptionally hard by job loss during 
the 1980s. In four of Liverpool’s six constituencies, swings of ten points or more to Labour were 
recorded, with the swing to Labour in the two Knowsley constituencies falling just short of double 
digits. By contrast, in suburban areas long dominated by the Conservatives, and far less affected by 
deindustrialisation, the swings to Labour were far more modest. Wirral West, Wirral South and 
Crosby all remained safe Conservative seats in 1987, while Wallasey was also retained by the 
Conservatives in the face of a Labour challenge. In Southport, the headline swing was to the Alliance, 
enabling the Liberal candidate to take the seat in 1987. Yet, support for the Conservatives remained 
strong here also and the party regained the seat in 1992. 
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 2015 2017
Labour Conservative Lib/Alliance/Lib Dem
Table 3: Swing from Conservative to Labour in Merseyside constituencies, 1979-87 
Constituency Swing to Labour 
Liverpool Mossley Hill 19.6 
Liverpool Broadgreen 17.2 
Liverpool Walton 14.4 
Liverpool West Derby 10.2 
Knowsley North 9.6 
Knowsley South 9.5 
Liverpool Garston 9.3 
Bootle 8.5 
Birkenhead 8.3 
Liverpool Riverside 6.5 
St Helens North 4.9 
Wallasey 4.8 
Wirral West 4.2 
Wirral South 2.8 
St Helens South 2.2 
Crosby 1.4 
Southport 0.7 
 
The sharp increase in Labour support on Merseyside between 1992 and 1997 arose from a very 
different dynamic to that seen from 1979-87. Set against a 10.2 point national swing to Labour in 
1997, constituency swings on Merseyside were again highly diverse. However, the geographical 
pattern observed from 1979-87 was essentially inverted. The four highest swings, of 14 points or 
more, were all in more affluent suburban areas and were of such magnitude that they handed three 
previously safe Conservative seats to Labour (Crosby, Wirral South, Wirral West) and transformed a 
Labour-Conservative marginal to a safe Labour seat (Wallasey). The 18.1 point swing to Labour in 
Crosby was the third highest recorded in 1997 and counted among the most surprising results of 
New Labour’s landslide. Indeed, despite being the first seat of the night to change hands from the 
Conservatives to Labour, there were no television cameras present to witness it; nobody had 
seriously expected the Conservatives to forfeit Crosby.  
 
Table 4: Swing from Conservative to Labour in Merseyside constituencies, 1992-1997  
Constituency Swing to Labour 
Crosby 18.1 
Wallasey 16.9 
Wirral South 15.4 
Wirral West 13.8 
Knowsley North & Sefton East 12.5 
Liverpool, Wavertree 12.4 
Liverpool, Garston 9.8 
St Helens North 9.1 
St Helens South 8.6 
Birkenhead 8.5 
Knowsley South 7.8 
Southport 6.5 
Liverpool, West Derby 6.2 
Liverpool, Walton 6.1 
Bootle 6.0 
Liverpool, Riverside 1.7 
 
In the context of the Blair landslide, these Labour victories in previously safe Conservative seats on 
Merseyside were remarkable, but not exceptional. What was exceptional was that Labour 
subsequently retained them. In 1997, Labour gained 19 traditionally Conservative seats with rates of 
owner occupation above 70 per cent on swings of 12 points or more. However, all but four of these 
constituencies (or their redrawn successor seats) had returned safely to the Conservative fold by 
2015.5 In addition to Gedling in Nottinghamshire, the exceptions were all on Merseyside: Wirral 
South, Wirral West, and Sefton Central (the successor seat to Crosby). Moreover, Labour has done 
more than simply retain its seats in suburban Merseyside. As table 5 illustrates, electoral support has 
swung significantly towards Labour in these areas since 2010, establishing Sefton Central and Wirral 
South as safe Labour seats and consolidating Labour’s majority in Wirral West. Equally notable is the 
14 point swing to Labour in Wallasey; a safe Conservative seat until 1987, it now has a 48 point 
Labour majority.  
Table 5: Swing from Conservative to Labour in Merseyside constituencies, 2010-17 
Constituency Swing to Labour 
Wallasey 13.9 
Liverpool, Riverside 13.3 
Sefton Central 11.0 
Liverpool, Wavertree 10.9 
Southport 10.2 
Wirral West 9.2 
Liverpool, West Derby 9.0 
Wirral South 8.5 
Garston and Halewood 8.3 
Birkenhead 7.4 
Bootle 7.2 
Knowsley 7.1 
Liverpool, Walton 5.9 
St Helens South and Whiston 5.5 
St Helens North 3.6 
 
How the suburbs were won 
The patterns of electoral change outlined above offer important clues as to where explanations for 
the emergence of Merseyside’s red suburbs should focus. As well as accounting for the particularly 
pronounced shifts to Labour in Merseyside’s suburbs in 1997, the more puzzling consolidation of 
Labour’s position in these areas over the subsequent 20 years requires explanation. Moreover, given 
the observed spatial patterns of political change on Merseyside, there is a need to identify how 
Labour’s earlier consolidation in core inner-urban constituencies was transmitted, centrifugally, to 
the outer-suburbs. Four potential factors are set out below. In each case, the proximity of these 
suburban constituencies to Liverpool is of direct importance.  
The first factor is psephological and centres on the role of the Liberal Party and its successors in 
facilitating the long-term movement of support from the Conservatives to Labour. Prior to Blair’s 
repositioning of Labour on the centre-left, many Merseyside suburbanites seeking to vote against 
the Conservatives had opted for the Liberals, the SDP or the Liberal Democrats. Liverpool had 
emerged as a key centre of the Liberal Party revival in the 1970s, with the party’s dramatic surge in 
support in the 1973 council election precipitating the decline of the Conservatives in Liverpool.6 By 
the early 1980s, the Liberals were consistently ahead of the Conservatives in local elections and by 
the mid-1980s they had eclipsed the Conservatives as the main party of opposition in the city. 
Importantly, Liberal success in Liverpool had been built on the local party’s development of 
community-based ‘pavement politics’. The accumulated campaigning expertise and capacity greatly 
assisted the efforts of the Alliance to make in-roads in Merseyside. Other than the 1981 Crosby by-
election, the only Alliance victory in outer Merseyside was in Southport in 1987. However, the rise in 
the third-party vote had the impact of reducing Conservative Party vote shares (but not majorities) 
and this proved crucial in 1997, when widespread tactical voting took place. Voters who had 
supported the Alliance in the 1980s had little difficulty switching to New Labour in 1997. The effect 
was most evident in Crosby, where previous support for the Alliance had been strongest, and the 
swing to Labour in 1997 was greatest. As Brian Cathcart puts it “Crosby had once, briefly, been an 
SDP seat for Shirley Williams, but now the well-heeled LibDems of Crosby were voting tactically in 
their thousands to get the Conservatives out”.7  
Such tactical voting is unlikely to have occurred but for the second factor: a shift in how Merseyside 
suburbanites perceived the city of Liverpool and its politics. To a remarkable degree, political 
identities in the affluent Merseyside suburbs were underpinned in the 1980s and early 1990s by a 
concern to disassociate from the economic decline of Liverpool, its related social problems and its 
descent into political chaos. As Shirley Williams recalls in her memoir, when she arrived in Crosby to 
fight the November 1981 by-election, she found that: 
(...) respectable middle-class families lived behind looped lace curtains in Victorian houses – 
it was as if they were pulling their skirts above their ankles to escape the degradation of a 
Liverpool that was running down and beset by riots and crime. Liverpool was Labour, had 
been for decades. That was one reason that Crosby was so Conservative. Beyond Crosby, 
alongside the wide sandy beaches of the Mersey estuary, were Blundellsands and Formby, 
desirable places to live. They were occasionally reminded of their great city neighbour by the 
detritus and lumps of sewage washed up by the tide.8  
By the mid-1990s, the decline of Liverpool had bottomed-out as the regeneration efforts of the 
previous 15 years began to bear fruit. The granting of European Objective 1 status for Merseyside in 
1993 had commenced the process of injecting hundreds of millions of pounds of investment into the 
city-region. Meanwhile, the association between Liverpool and the radical left politics of Militant 
was weakening rapidly, particularly given Labour’s re-positioning nationally. By 1997, voters in 
Crosby or on the Wirral were much less inclined to associate a vote for Labour with the Trotskyist 
rhetoric of Derek Hatton or the desperate job-seeking of Yosser Hughes.9 
In the decade or so following Labour’s 1997 general election victory, the relationship between 
Liverpool and its suburbs underwent a dramatic transformation. New Labour policies aimed to 
establish cities as engines of improved regional economic performance. Underpinned by national 
economic growth and a second round of Objective 1 funding from 2000-06, local policy-makers 
responded to this agenda enthusiastically. The local conversion to urban entrepreneurialism was 
dramatically accelerated by the Liberal Democrats taking control of Liverpool City Council, somewhat 
ironically, in the immediate aftermath of Labour’s 1997 landslide. The resurgence of Liverpool in the 
2000s, epitomised by its year as European Capital of Culture in 2008, reversed the long-term 
‘hollowing-out’ of Merseyside. The city’s population and employment base began to grow for the 
first time in 100 years, drawing ‘isolationist’ outer-suburbs into a closer relationship with the newly-
dynamic metropolitan core. The Merseyrail network, which had previously allowed archetypal 
Conservative voters to escape Liverpool, now facilitated a reconnection of the suburbs to the city. 
From 1997 to 2015, passenger usage of the two principal stations at the centre of the Merseyrail 
network increased fifteen-fold. That the reinvention of the city owed much, politically, to the Liberal 
Democrats, was neither here nor there. Liverpool’s identity had undergone a transformation and its 
new-found cosmopolitanism was open to commuters too. Things had only got better, and it was not 
the Conservatives who could claim credit for it. 
The structure of the city-region, including the connectivity afforded by its transport infrastructure, 
has also played a role with respect to the third factor: the cumulative imbalance of campaigning 
capacity between the Conservative and Labour. The decline of the Conservatives as an electoral 
force in Liverpool has been so absolute that they have not been represented on the city council since 
1998. With no base in local government, the Liverpool Conservatives have shrunk to the point that 
they rarely campaign actively in more than a single ward. Conservative Associations on the Wirral 
and in Sefton have also had to contend with falling membership levels and an ageing activist base. 
By contrast, Labour’s increased dominance in Liverpool and Merseyside politics has enabled it to 
sustain a large local membership and activist base. The enormous contrasts in the capacity of the 
local parties to engage with the electorate has become increasingly evident. The presence of ultra-
safe Labour seats at the core of the city-region, where the largest concentration of its activists is 
based, has also facilitated the movement of activists out to the suburbs at election time. Labour’s 
scope to deploy large numbers of campaigners in areas such as Wirral West has undoubtedly played 
a key role in countering the electoral advantages afforded to local Conservative candidates by the 
strategic channelling of donations to local Conservative Associations.10 
The final factor was a uniquely local source of anti-Tory sentiment, the political impact of which is 
impossible to quantify, yet obvious to anyone who spends time in the city-region. In April 1989, the 
Hillsborough disaster resulted in the death of 96 Liverpool supporters attending the FA Cup semi-
final. The disturbing chain of events which followed, involving collusion at the highest level between 
politicians, the police and the media to falsely lay the blame for the disaster with the Liverpool fans, 
cannot be adequately summarised here. In simple terms, the outcome was that the Conservatives, 
and particularly Margaret Thatcher, came to be held responsible locally for sanctioning the 
fabrication of police witness statements and for feeding falsehoods to sections of the Conservative-
supporting press. Almost 30 years on, the Sun newspaper, which ran the most notorious front-page 
story propagating lies about the behaviour of Liverpool supporters, faces a boycott so effective that 
it is virtually impossible to buy on Merseyside. Importantly, Hillsborough affected the suburbs as 
much as the city. Many of those who died, and many more who survived but thereafter lived with 
the trauma of attending the game, came from the outer boroughs. Hillsborough connected the city 
to the suburbs emotionally, via family and friendship networks, and though the fundamental 
significance of football to the cultural life of Merseyside. The siting of Hillsborough memorials 
outside Crosby library and at Port Sunlight on the Wirral are testament to how the impact of the 
disaster reached directly, and indefinitely, into the Conservative suburbs.  
This paper has sought to explain the exceptional case of Merseyside’s red suburbs. As a case study of 
outliers, in both a geographical and psephological sense, it is instructive in several ways. There is 
growing evidence that place matters to political preferences. Despite past scepticism, the possibility 
of neighbourhood effects on voting behaviour, centred on the proposition that ‘people to who talk 
together, vote together’, is being revisited.11 To date, discussion has mostly centred on the 
polarisation between big cities and university towns, on one hand, and smaller towns locked into 
long-term decline, on the other. The dynamics of political change in the suburbs has received far less 
attention, partly because of the long-standing assumption that suburbanisation fosters conservative 
bias.12 Yet, the Merseyside case suggests that suburbs do not automatically tack to the right 
politically and that specifically local factors, including shifts in the relationship between cities and 
suburbs, can radically alter the politics of the latter. The time may be ripe to pay more attention to 
what we can learn from the outliers.  
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